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During the past decade, right to die cases rose to the forefront of
both public and judicial attention. These cases primarily focused on de-
fining an individual's right to stop maintenance medical care' or on the
rights of a guardian to discontinue treatment of an incompetent pa-
tient.2 Liability concerns centered on potential civil or criminal liability
for hospitals and physicians that effectuated the wishes of a patient or
her family.3
Today, with the rights of individuals relatively well established, it
is important to consider those situations in which a health care provider
does not comply with an individual's wish to terminate life support. Be-
cause the right to die has gained widespread acceptance only recently,
the courts have yet to give adequate consideration to liability for failure
to respect this right. Only a handful of cases addresses the issues of
improper initiation or continuation of life support. Similarly, although
many states have enacted living will or natural death statutes, few of
these statutes adequately contemplate possible problems that arise
when a physician or hospital willfully or negligently ignores an individ-
ual's wishes. The recently enacted Patient Self-Determination Act4
forces hospitals and physicians to confront the many difficult issues sur-
rounding living wills and advance directives. This heightened awareness
will force the legal community to give more thoughtful and comprehen-
sive consideration to advance directives and the issues which surround
them.
The possibility of such conflicts is not solely theoretical. For exam-
ple, consider the situation in which an ambulance brings the victim of
an automobile accident to a-hospital with a pro-life orientation. The
patient's condition deteriorates, and although the patient's living will
states that she does not want to be supported by artificial means, in the
process of treating the patient, the attending physician connects her to
a ventilator. If the physician or hospital cannot disconnect the machine
in good conscience, the patient will receive treatment against her will.
1. Maintenance medical care generally refers to treatment that merely prolongs life instead
of curing the illness or disease. This type of care also can be characterized as "extraordinary life-
sustaining treatment." In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (1985). The distinction is
hazy at best. For example, a respirator may be ordinary treatment for one patient but extraordi-
nary for another. Id. at 1235.
2. See generally notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
3. This type of participation generally is referred to as passive, versus active, participation.
Passive euthanasia constitutes acts that simply let the patient die whereas active euthanasia has-
tens death. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1219. The Conroy court recognized, quite appropriately, that
"[t]he distinction is particularly nebulous ... in the context of decisions whether to withhold or
withdraw life-sustaining treatment." Id. at 1234.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (Supp. 1992). See notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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A similar situation arises when a patient enters the hospital in rela-
tively good health and later deteriorates to the point of needing artifi-
cial life support. The patient and her family may face a situation in
which the hospital has no procedures for disconnecting life support,
thus producing a delay in allowing the family to come to terms with the
death while they search for another hospital without this type of policy.
This Note addresses these types of problems. Part II identifies
problems and conflicting interests that may prevent compliance with
advance directives or a patient's express wishes. Part III explores the
current state of the law with regard to liability and recovery for non-
compliance with advance directives by reviewing case law and providing
a general survey of the relevant provisions in state living will and natu-
ral death statutes. Part IV presents possible solutions that could mini-
mize both the occurrences of improper maintenance of life support and
the conflicts between patient and provider interests to preserve the au-
tonomy of both parties.
II. THE CONFLICT: BALANCING PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION WITH THE
CONCERNS AND AUTONOMY OF HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
The "right to die" creates a wealth of issues and potential conflicts.
The questions presented in these cases require difficult choices and de-
cisions without offering any easy solutions. The courts often consider
patient autonomy to be the fundamental issue in right to die cases, and
correctly so. Although some courts may hold this interest as absolute,
consideration of physician or hospital autonomy and other concerns fac-
ing health care providers should temper this belief 5 Thus, the general
categories of either the patient or the physician interests provide a
framework through which to view the issues and conflicts that the right
to die creates.
A. Patient Autonomy and Self-Determination
Since the first right to die cases, courts have given patient auton-
omy substantial weight in deciding that individuals have the absolute
right to control the course of their own medical treatment. Physicians
must respect their patients' autonomy; this duty reflects our society's
basic values and our belief in individual autonomy.' A person's right to
5. For the remainder of this Note, "hospital or physician autonomy" will refer to the individ-
ual religious, ethical, or moral beliefs of the physician or health care provider.
6. Justice Cardozo expressed this belief in Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-




control her own body is a "basic societal concept," which has long been
recognized in common law.7 The doctrine of informed consent embodies
society's recognition of this value and thus binds all physicians.' That
the doctrine of informed consent includes the patient's choice to refuse
treatment is well accepted.'
This background provided the foundation for courts that addressed
and sought to define an individual's right to die. In In re Quinlan,10 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey became one of the first courts to address
an individual's right to refuse medical treatment. This court held that
an individual's right to privacy, found in the unwritten penumbra of
the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, included the right to decline
medical treatment." Although the state had legitimate interests both in
the preservation of life and in allowing physicians to heal patients, the
individual's privacy right outweighed the state's interests as the pa-
tient's prognosis worsened.'2
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the right to die issue
again in In re Conroy.'3 Although the Quinlan holding was restricted to
patients in a persistent vegetative state, the court in Conroy contem-
plated conscious patients with short life expectancies. 14 The court con-
cluded that withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment was
permissible under certain circumstances. 15
The United States Supreme Court addressed the rights of a patient
in a persistent vegetative state in the now famous Cruzan v. Director,
7. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1221.
8. The doctrine of informed consent is the primary means in the law to protect this per-
sonal interest in the integrity of one's body. "Under this doctrine, no medical procedure may be
performed without a patient's consent, obtained after explanation of the nature of the treatment,
substantial risks, and alternative therapies." Id. at 1222 (citations omitted).
9. Id. (citations omitted).
10. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
11. Id. at 663 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)).
12. 355 A.2d at 663-64. The Quinlan court further held that because the patient was in a
persistent vegetative state and thus incompetent to assert her own rights, her guardian's and fam-
ily's substituted judgment would suffice to protect those rights. Id. at 664. Thus, with a diagnosis
by her attending physicians of her terminal condition and with the approval of her family and
guardian, life support could be withdrawn without civil or criminal liability for any participant,
health care provider, or guardian. Id. at 671-72. Furthermore, in the future, similar declaratory
relief actions would not be necessary in like situations. Id. at 672.
13. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1209.
14. This case considered a patient who was "awake and conscious.. . but whose mental and
physical functioning [was] severely and permanently impaired and whose life expectancy, even
with the treatment, [was] relatively short." Id. at 1228-29.
15. The court allowed withdrawal of life support when the patient's subjective desire is suffi-
ciently established, when, under a limited-objective test, it is apparent that the patient would have
refused treatment and that the burdens of life outweighed the benefits of life for the patient, or
when, under a pure-objective test, the burdens of life outweighed its benefits and the severe pain
of continued treatment would be cruel. Id. at 1229, 1232, 1236.
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Missouri Department of Health.1" The Court recognized a competent
person's constitutionally protected liberty interest in denying unwanted
medical treatment.17 It restricted its holding, however, to competent in-
dividuals. The Court concluded that a state could require clear and
convincing evidence of the incompetent patient's wishes before a surro-
gate could authorize the withdrawal of life support."8 Furthermore, the
Court did not require a state to accept the substituted judgment of
close family members.'9 Therefore, although the Court in Cruzan recog-
nized the right of a patient to refuse medical treatment, it qualified this
protection by holding that a state could restrict an incompetent pa-
tient's rights by requiring heightened evidentiary standards to prove
that patient's wishes.
Cruzan confirmed that our society values and recognizes patient
autonomy. The growing acceptance of living wills and other advance
directives further confirms this judicial valuation.20 Thus, courts and
legislators always should give significant deference to patient autonomy
when evaluating the failure to recognize a patient's wish to discontinue
medical treatment.
Given that some physicians and health care facilities comply more
willingly than others with advance directives requiring the cessation of
maintenance life support, one possible solution suggests that individu-
als choose their health care providers based on the provider's right to
die stance. To this end, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)21
provides some relief and guidance. The statute provides that hospitals
16. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
17. Id. at 278.
18. Id. at 281-82.
19. Id. at 286.
20. Virtually all the states have enacted living will or natural death statutes. Furthermore,
professional organizations, such as the American Medical Association, have endorsed these docu-
ments in planning for terminal illness. See Linda L. Emanuel, et al., Advance Directives for Medi-
cal Care-A Case for Greater Use, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 889 (1991).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1) provides in relevant part:
[Tihe requirement of this subsection is that a provider of services or prepaid or eligible
organization (as the case may be) maintain written policies and procedures with respect to all
adult individuals receiving medical care by or through the provider or organization-
(A) to provide written information to each such individual concerning-
(i) an individual's rights under State law (whether statutory or as recognized
by the courts of the State) to make decisions concerning such medical care, in-
cluding the right to accept or refuse medical or surgical treatment and the right to
formulate advance directives (as defined in paragraph (3)), and
(ii) the written policies of the provider or organization respecting the imple-
mentation of such rights;
(B) to document in the individual's medical record whether or not the individual has
executed an advance directive;
(C) not to condition the provision of care or otherwise discriminate against an indi-
vidual based on whether or not the individual has executed an advance directive;
1993] 1259
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must inform patients of their rights to refuse medical treatment under
the applicable state law and further must respect those rights.22 Addi-
tionally, hospitals must educate their patients on hospital policies re-
garding advance directives and the right to die. 3 Providers must
furnish this information upon an individual's admission to the
hospital.24
On its face, PSDA would appear to solve many, if not all, of the
conflicts between patients and physicians or hospitals over the right to
die. Upon closer analysis, however, the statute fails to contemplate
those situations frequently encountered by families who face decisions
regarding the termination of life support-hospitalization due to an
emergency. For instance, after a serious automobile accident, an ambu-
lance often takes the victim to the closest hospital. If that hospital con-
nects the patient to a ventilator or similar life support and has a pro-
life orientation, a conflict might ensue when the family asks the facility
to disconnect the victim from the life support system.
The court in Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital5
contemplated this situation. After a suicide attempt, an ambulance took
the plaintiffs' son to the defendant hospital. The attending physician
placed Jeffery Strachan on a respirator and diagnosed him as brain
dead, a result of gunshot wound to the head. Several days lapsed be-
tween the family's request that Jeffery be taken off the respirator and
the hospital's compliance with that request. This delay caused serious
emotional distress to the family.
26
Even if PSDA had been in effect at the time of this case, the hospi-
tal would not necessarily have informed the plaintiffs of both state and
hospital policies regarding refusal of medical treatment until after the
initiation of life support. Although informing patients of their rights
(D) to ensure compliance with requirements of State law (whether statutory or as
recognized by the courts of the State) respecting advance directives at facilities of the
provider or organization; and
(E) to provide (individually or with others) for education for staff and the commu-
nity on issues concerning advance directives.
22. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A) & (D).
23. Id. § 1395cc(f)(1)(A).
24. Id. § 1395cc(f)(2)(A).
25. 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988).
26. Id. at 347-49. The Strachan court described the plaintiffs' plight:
The record in this case reveals particularly compelling evidence of distress. Although plain-
tiffs were told that their son was brain dead and nothing further could be done for him, for
three days after requesting that their son be disconnected from the respirator plaintiffs con-
tinued to see him lying in bed, with tubes in his body, his eyes taped shut, and foam in his
mouth. His body remained warm to the touch. Had Jeffery's body been removed from the
respirator when his parents requested, a scene fraught with grief and heartache would have




upon admission may help to resolve conflicts arising during inpatient
procedures, individuals often need living wills in situations that are not
so clean and orderly. These situations present potential problems for
both the patient; as illustrated by Strachan, and the physician who
connects an individual to life support in an emergency situation. Com-
mon sense dictates that emergency room workers and paramedics
should receive some form of immunity for their acts of resuscitation or
initiation of life support. If not, concerns about potential liability for
initiating life support measures could disrupt the general flow of emer-
gency medicine. To date, however, only one state has codified such an
exemption.
2 7
B. Physician and Hospital Autonomy
Although the individual patient's autonomy certainly should be
given significant deference, any prudent analysis should balance this
factor against the values, ethics, and religious beliefs of both the physi-
cian treating the patient and the hospital where the patient is receiving
care. No health care provider should be forced to hasten a patient's
death if it violates her set of beliefs. Although society recognizes the
rights of individuals to control their own lives, it also should acknowl-
edge that members of the health care profession have the right to be
free of intrusions on their values.
Virtually all of the early cases addressing the right to die identified
the maintenance of the medical profession's integrity as a policy factor
competing with the individual's right to refuse medical treatment.28
Some courts have extended this concern to encompass the desire to
grant hospitals broad discretion to care for people under their control.2"
This desire to cure and heal often may conflict with the practice of
comforting the dying.30 Although still not fully accepted, it now appears
27. Enacted in January, 1992, New Jersey's Advance Directive for Health Care Act provides
in part:
The provisions of this act shall not be construed to require emergency personnel, including
paid or volunteer fire fighters; paramedics; members of an ambulance team, rescue squad, or
mobile intensive care unit; or emergency room personnel of a licensed health care institution,
to withhold or withdraw emergency care in circumstances which do not afford reasonable op-
portunity for careful review and evaluation of an advance directive without endangering the
life of the patient.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2h-70(b) (West Supp. 1992).
28. See, for example, Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223.
29. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427
(1977) (citations omitted).
30. "We glean from the record here that physicians distinguish between curing the ill and
comforting and easing the dying." Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 667.
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that more physicians regard "passive euthanasia," or the comfort of the
dying, as a valid medical endeavor31
The doctrine of informed consent acts as one way to safeguard the
medical profession's integrity from any harmful effects associated with
assisting in a patient's wish to die. A fully informed patient who
chooses a certain course of treatment accepts the outcome of that treat-
ment.2 Even after acknowledging that many physicians now accept a
patient's right to die and that informed consent may safeguard suffi-
ciently the ethical integrity of the medical profession, the possibility for
conflict still exists. Situations that might compromise the ethical integ-
rity of a single physician or health care provider rather than that of the
entire medical profession can arise easily.
Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center"3 illustrates this
point. Mr. Bartling first went to the Glendale Adventist Hospital for a
routine physical examination. A chest X-ray subsequently revealed a
lung tumor. During a needle biopsy of this tumor, Mr. Bartling's lung
collapsed, leading to his eventual placement on a ventilator in April,
1984. He often tried to disconnect himself from the ventilator, and on
May 30, 1984, executed a living will asking that he no longer be sup-
ported by artificial means. The declaration accompanying his living will
attested that attachment to the ventilator caused him substantial pain
and discomfort.3 4
Mr. Bartling further assigned to his wife a durable power of attor-
ney for health care and executed consent forms releasing the hospital
from civil liability if it acted in accordance with his wishes. Although
the hospital tried several times to wean him from the ventilator, each
time his breathing or heart stopped, and the medical staff resuscitated
him. Most of the physicians at Glendale shared the hospital's pro-life
orientation and could not, in good conscience, effectuate Mr. Bartling's
wish to be disconnected from the respirator.3 To satisfy Mr. Bartling's
and his family's wishes, Glendale tried to have him transferred to an-
other hospital, but no other facility would accept him. 6 Even with clear
statements of intent, the attending physicians refused to remove the
31. See, for example, Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1225. See also note 3.
32. On this point, the Conroy court stated:
If the patient rejected the doctor's advice, the onus of that decision would rest on the patient,
not the doctor. Indeed, if the patient's right to informed consent is to have any meaning at
all, it must be accorded respect even when it conflicts with the advice of the doctor or the
values of the medical profession as a whole.
Id.
33. 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
34. Id. at 361-63.
35. Id. at 362.
36. Id.
1262 [Vol. 46:1255
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ventilator and refused to remove Mr. Bartling's restraints to allow him
to disconnect the machine himself.37
This situation presents a legal dilemma because the hospital clearly
administered treatment against Mr. Bartling's wishes. Although the
hospital and physicians tried to comply with Mr. Bartling's wishes by
transferring him to another facility, they could not find another hospi-
tal willing to take him, and they could not effectuate his wishes them-
selves in good conscience. 8 In this situation, not only is the patient's
autonomy at stake, but also the autonomy of the physician. One should
not impose her values upon anyone else, including health care
providers.
The potential moral hazard facing health care providers if they are
not held accountable for failing to comply with patient wishes also
should affect the balance between physician and patient autonomy. If
not subject to liability, hospitals or other providers may prolong patient
care, consciously or unconsciously, to generate increased revenues. In
Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum,39 the court identified this
concern as a potential side effect of its holding that declined to absolve
a patient's family from liability on the contract for hospital services for
the time in which the patient received life support over their objec-
tions.4" The court concluded that this concern did not outweigh the
"potential evil" that might occur if a patient whose life could be saved
died.41
37. Id. at 361.
38. See also Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 183 A.D.2d 10, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992), in which a health care facility refused to disconnect a patient from nutrition
and hydration for ethical reasons. In its decision, the court remarked, "While we recognize the
right of a patient to control the course of his or her treatment, we do not recognize any right to
force a health-care provider to render treatment which is contrary to his or her conscience." 588
N.Y.S.2d at 859. See also notes 98-100 and 124-30 and accompanying text.
39. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
40. Id. at 860.
41. Id. In discussing the issue, the court stated:
It is asserted that, in light of our decision today, all health care providers in charge of compe-
tent patients will have an additional financial incentive to prolong the lives of such patients
over the objections of the patients' families. This may be true, and the potential evil which we
see is that some beleaguered families may, regrettably, be forced to resort to litigation, al-
though we believe that the dissent overdramatizes the extent to which this might place a
burden on the judicial system. What is not noted is that, if Mr. Elbaum's conduct in this case
were condoned, health care providers would have an additional financial incentive to obey,
without question, the orders of those conservators who might prematurely despair of their
conservatee's recovery, or the orders of those conservators whose judgment might be tainted
by motives less altruistic than Mr. Elbaum's. The potential evil we see resulting from this, i.e.,




By contrast, the dissent in Grace Plaza found the patient's right to
autonomy supreme.42 This difference of opinion presents a central con-
flict: physicians and hospitals should not be forced to perform acts they
consider unethical, but they should not profit from a failure to act.
If an individual has an advance directive, the general assumption is
that she wants the directive to be followed.43 Nevertheless, several situ-
ations come to mind in which a patient may not want her advance di-
rective strictly followed. First, a potentially reversible episode could
cause the patient to need the assistance of life support for only a short
period, after which the patient could resume a normal life.4 Even if the
patient would acquiesce to treatment in such instances, however, no
physician can know absolutely which episodes are reversible. At the
time, a physician may believe a condition is reversible and only later
discover that permanent connection to a ventilator is required. Looking
at the events with perfect hindsight, a sympathetic jury might find phy-
sicians liable for acts that appear6d reasonable at their inception.
Second, but not unrelated to the first issue, the patient's advance
directive may not be as comprehensive or detailed as the physician re-
quires. For example, it may not provide guidance on how to act during
a potentially reversible episode.45 Moreover, the directive may not spec-
ify what type of treatments the patient considers life-sustaining. 4" This
problem creates uncertainty not only for the hospital and physicians,
42. Justice Rosenblatt remarked: "The advancement of professional ethics to support the
preservation of life has epitomized the medical profession, to the public benefit. However powerful
those interests may be, they should not serve as a platform to afford compensation for unwanted
services, rendered adversely to the patient's declared right of autonomy." Id. at 868 (Rosenblatt,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. If a patient has gone to the effort to enact an advance directive, it logically follows that
the patient wants that directive followed. But see Ashwini Sehgal, et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis
Patients Want Their Advance Directives Followed?, 267 JAMA 59 (1992).
44. See Marion Danis, et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives For Life-Sustaining
Care, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 882, 884-85 (1991) (describing a situation in which a patient was
briefly given artificial ventilation for a reversible episode of respiratory failure despite a living
will).
45. Consider the following scenario. A patient with lung cancer enacts a living will. During
the course of her illness, the patient begins experiencing headaches. The attending physician elects
to order a CAT scan to see if the cancer has spread to the brain. In this procedure, the physician
uses contrast dye, which routinely causes allergic reactions in patients. Such reactions generally are
reversible but require a brief period of artificial ventilation. If the patient experiences such a reac-
tion, it is a result of the treatment, not the illness. In such a case, whether the patient would want
to be resuscitated is unclear.
46. See William C. Knapp and Fred Hamilton, "Wrongful Living". Resuscitation as Tortious
Interference with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. Ky. L. Rev. 253, 264-65
(1992). Some patients might consider treatments such as chemotherapy, dialysis, or antibiotics to
be life-sustaining for the purpose of an advance directive. Id. at 265.
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but also for the patient's family who may not know the actual intent
and scope of the document.
47
Patient uncertainty also hinders a physician's ability to decide
whether to follow an advance directive. A recent study suggests that
patients may not want their advance directives strictly followed.4 8 This
study produced widely differing responses. Subjects' responses greatly
differed when asked how much leeway their physician and surrogate
should have to override their advance directive if overriding the direc-
tive were in the subjects' best interests. The subjects replied as follows:
no leeway (thirty-nine percent), a little leeway (nineteen percent), a lot
of leeway (eleven percent), and complete leeway (thirty-one percent).49
These discrepancies between an individual's actual and written intent
pose a problem for health care providers. An advance directive should
provide an accurate version of the individual's intent; any second-guess-
ing about a patient's intent greatly diminishes the value and effective-
ness of the instrument.
Hospitals and physicians also face other concerns that may shape
and motivate their courses of action. Today, a severe shortage of organs
donated for transplantation exists .5 The need for these organs has the
potential to collide with right to die issues because brain dead patients
comprise the primary source of such donations. Although an individual
may express a wish to be disconnected from artificial support in an ad-
vance directive, the hospital and society have a substantial utilitarian
interest in keeping the patient alive until the donor's organs can be re-
moved, or until the family can be convinced to consent to the donation.
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital5' hinted at this
possibility. Glendale Hospital actively participated in organ transplants
and affiliated itself with the Delaware Valley Transplant Program. One
of the patient's attending physicians recorded in the medical chart that
47. A conflict between the patient's wishes in the form of an advance directive and the
desires of the patient's family might jeopardize the individual's autonomy. Suppose, for instance,
that the patient expressed a wish to be maintained on life support, but the family wants the indi-
vidual disconnected either to get the inheritance or simply to prevent a drain on the estate's fi-
nances. In these situations, it is clear that the patient's wishes should control. David Randolph
Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 850, 887 (1986). To preserve
patient autonomy and to prevent courts from having to discern proper from improper family mo-
tives, the individual's expressed wishes should dictate the course of treatment. Similarly, a living
will should take precedence over a durable power of attorney for health care.
48. Sehgal, 267 JAMA at 61 (cited in note 43).
49. Id.
50. See generally Mike Woods, Organ Donations Vital, Chi. Trib. 7 (Oct. 15, 1992) (stating
that although almost 24,000 people are on waiting lists for organ transplants, there are only about
4,000 donations each year).
51. 109 N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346, 346 (1988).
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his organs could be harvested if parental consent was obtained.2 The
plaintiffs subsequently informed the hospital that they did not wish to
donate their son's organs and wished to have him disconnected from
the respirator." Another physician advised them to consider their deci-
sion further.54 Receiving no change in reply after several days, the hos-
pital finally disconnected the patient from the ventilator. 5
This case suggests that the facility maintained the patient's life
support while attempting to persuade the family to donate his organs.
These situations bring to light a potential conflict between the duties of
a patient's attending physician, who has a duty to follow and respect
her patient's wishes, and the interests of a physician or hospital that
participates in an organ transplantation program and seeks organs for
harvesting.56 Although this conflict potentially could jeopardize an indi-
vidual's autonomy, only one state's natural death statute contemplates
this conflict by forbidding individuals involved in organ transplantation
from participating in decisions to withdraw life support.
57
Two additional factors may account for noncompliance with an ad-
vance directive: simple negligence and fear of potential liability. Physi-
cians and hospitals may not follow living wills for the simple reason
that the instruments are unknown to the hospital or its staff.5 8 In these
instances, easy remedies exist. PSDA certainly will increase hospital
staff awareness of these documents, thereby helping to decrease non-
compliance due to simple negligence. 9
52. Id. at 347.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 348.
56. See Kirker v. Orange County, 519 S.2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (allowing the plain-
tiff to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the county medical
examiner who removed her dead daughter's eyes and corneas for transplantation without authori-
zation). But compare Mandatory Organ Donation Sought, N.Y. Times C7 (Dec. 23, 1992) (discuss-
ing a proposal that would make organ donation mandatory unless the individual or a relative
objects in advance).
57. Mississippi is the only state to address this potential conflict of interest. Its living will
statute provides in part: "No physician participating in a decision to withdraw life-sustaining
mechanisms from a declarant may participate in transplanting the vital organs of the declarant to
another person." Miss. Code § 41-41-115(3) (Supp. 1992).
58. A study in the New England Journal of Medicine confirms this theory. In a study of
patients with advance directives at nursing homes, a survey determined that although advance
directives were placed into the medical charts of the nursing home 74% of the time, the directives
were incorporated into hospital medical charts in only 25 of 71 occasions. Danis, 324 New Eng. J.
Med. at 884 (cited in note 44). Members of the nursing staff at hospitals receiving the patients
from nursing homes commented that staff turnover often caused the unfamiliarity with and infre-
quent transfer of the documents. Id.
59. PSDA provides that hospitals must ensure compliance with state law, record in the pa-
tient's medical chart whether she has an advance directive, and educate their staffs about advance
directives. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f)(1)(B), (D), & (E).
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Fear of liability proved to be one of the reasons why hospitals and
physicians hesitated to comply with patients' wishes to die in early
cases. Most statutes, however, provide immunity for physicians, hospi-
tals, and health care providers for acting reasonably in respect of a pa-
tient's wishes.8 0 In those states that do not have natural death statutes
and have not established immunity by case law, however, fear of poten-
tial liability still may influence many health care providers. In Grace
Plaza,"1 the plaintiff needed to obtain a court order before his wife
could be disconnected from life support. The court noted that Grace
Plaza could not be expected to disconnect a patient before obtaining a
court order because this act might implicate liability. 2 Thus, the fear of
liability remains a very real factor affecting the way health care provid-
ers approach the withdrawal of life support.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING IMPROPER
MAINTENANCE OF LIFE SUPPORT
This Part provides an overview and analysis of the current state of
the law with regard to finding physicians, hospitals, or other health care
providers liable for noncompliance with a patient's wish to be discon-
nected from life support." The first subpart will review the types of
actions brought in the courts and which types have succeeded. The sec-
ond subpart examines the status of state living will and natural death
statutes, focusing on how they address the issues of noncompliance and
physician and hospital autonomy.
A. Causes of Action for Improper Maintenance of Life Support
As a matter of common sense, noncompliance with a patient's
wishes should give rise to some type of liability. To date, however, the
courts have not granted significant monetary recovery to a patient or
her family. 4 This Part analyzes situations under which cases have been
60. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
61. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d 853.
62. "New York provides for civil, administrative, and... even criminal penalties for any
health-care professional who violates these obligations without court approval." Id. at 857.
63. Hospital ethics committees that serve in advisory roles to physicians, hospitals, family
members, and patients also could face liability. Andrew L. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital
Ethics Committees, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1239 (1987). In general, these committees help to shape
hospital procedures, educate both the hospital staff and the general public, and consult physicians
when difficult decisions must be made regarding individual patients. Id. at 1243. Given their advi-
sory and policy shaping roles, these committees may become exposed to lawsuits by patients or
their family members. Id. at 1241.
64. M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penalties for Failing to Honor Patient Wishes to Refuse
Treatment, 11 S.L.U. Pub. L. Rev. 499 (1992). "Despite the accelerated momentum of legal and
public opinion supporting patient choice at the end of life, there is a large disjunction between
what the law requires and the actual practice in the health care setting." Id. at 502.
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brought, what types of actions have been brought, and which cases have
been successful.
1. Battery
Breach of informed consent may give rise to an action in negligence
or an action in the intentional tort of battery.6 5 Thus, a patient conceiv-
ably could bring an action in battery for the improper maintenance of
life support. In Estate of Leach v. Shapiro,66 the plaintiffs brought an
action for damages for the time that the hospital maintained Edna
Marie Leach on life support against her and her family's wishes. The
medical team at Akron General Hospital restored Mrs. Leach's heart-
beat after she suffered a cardiac arrest, but she remained in a persistent
vegetative state. On October 21, 1980, Mrs. Leach's husband and guard-
ian petitioned the probate court for an order to terminate life support.
6 7
The ventilator was disconnected finally on January 6, 1981.68
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages, contending that the hos-
pital placed Mrs. Leach on life support and wrongfully maintained her
contrary to her and her family's wishes.6 9 The court agreed that the
doctrine of informed consent included the right to refuse treatment and
that the breach of such a duty could support an action for battery. °
The plaintiffs did not allege, however, that the resuscitation efforts
amounted to a battery, but that the hospital's improper placement of
Mrs. Leach's on life support without her or her family's consent consti-
tuted battery.71 Therefore, whether the plaintiffs stated a valid claim
depended upon when and under what pretext the hospital connected
Mrs. Leach to the life support systems. 2 If she was connected to life
support as part of the resuscitation efforts, this situation would insulate
the defendants from liability.7 3 The plaintiffs viewed the timing of the
connection of life support dffferently, alleging that the defendants con-
nected Mrs. Leach after she was already in a chronic vegetative state.74
They contended that absent an emergency, the defendants needed to
secure the family's consent, which they would have denied because Mrs.
Leach previously had expressed to the defendants her desire not to be
65. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B cmt. i (1979).
66. 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
67. Id. at 1051.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1052.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1053-54.
73. Id. at 1052.
74. Id. at 1053.
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kept alive by machines.7 5 Therefore, the maintenance of a cause of ac-
tion for battery in this case depended upon the timing and context in
which Mrs. Leach was connected to life support. Nevertheless, this case
does stand for the proposition that the potential for a cause of action in
battery does exist.
Bartling6 also affirms the potential of bringing a cause of action in
battery for improper maintenance of life support. After Mr. Bartling
died in November, 1986, his family brought an action for battery. The
court dismissed the family's action primarily because the establishment
of the rights of patients in California in such a situation had not
evolved yet.7 8 The court found that a common or comprehensive legal
standard was not present at the time of the patient's hospitalization to
guide the medical community.79 Because his rights were not defined
during the time of his hospitalization, the court could not find that the
defendant consciously acted to disregard Mr. Bartling's constitutional
rights.80 Furthermore, because Mr. Bartling died, any cause of action he
had for pain and suffering died with him.81 Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the action in battery was dismissed properly.
82
Bartling, therefore, does not stand for the proposition that a plain-
tiff cannot succeed in an action for battery. Rather, the patient's rights
were not defined sufficiently to support an action arising from the im-
proper maintenance of life support. Furthermore, Mr. Bartling's poten-
tial causes of action died with him. A court would face a different
situation, however, if the patient is living or her rights are defined more
adequately. 83
2. Duty to Provide Procedures for the Removal of Life Support
Given the increased awareness and execution of living wills, health
care providers could face a duty to have procedures in place to remove
75. Id. The case was remanded for further fact finding on why and when Mrs. Leach was
connected to life support. Id. at 1055.
76. Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Ctr., 184 Cal. App. 3d 961, 229 Cal. Rptr. 360
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
77. Id. at 361. The plaintiffs also alleged breach of fiduciary duty, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, violation of federal civil rights, and conspiracy. Id.
78. Id. at 363.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 364.
81. Id. The court noted that the applicable survival statute only provided for limited dam-
ages and did not include an award for pain and suffering. Id. at 364 n.6.
82. Id. at 364.
83. Under either a battery or a negligence framework, an individual or her family could at-
tempt to argue a "wrongful living" cause of action as tortious interference with the right to die




patients from life support systems.84 With such a duty acknowledged,
any delay in taking a patient off of life support because of a failure to
have procedures established could give rise to an action in negligence.
To date, only one case has addressed this issue.
In Strachan,"5 the plaintiffs argued that the hospital had a duty to
have procedures in place for the removal of life support upon the re-
quest of the patient's family."' The plaintiffs sought damages from the
hospital and hospital administrator for negligent infliction of emotional
distress for the hospital's failure to have termination of life support
procedures in place. 7 In addition, the plaintiffs sought damages for the
mental distress caused by the willful holding of their son by the hospi-
tal, preventing a proper burial.88 The jury found for the plaintiffs on
both counts and awarded damages in the amount of $140,000. 8'
The intermediate appellate court reversed and found that the
plaintiffs did not establish a cause of action under either theory.90 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey disagreed, but hesitated to force upon all
hospitals the duty to have such procedures in place.9' The court con-
cluded that public policy prevented them from announcing an absolute
duty binding all hospitals to have established procedures for the re-
moval of life support mechanisms upon the request of a patient's fam-
ily. '2 The court found that the imposition of such a duty was not proper
for the court, but should be addressed by the hospitals and physicians
themselves.9 If the medical community considered this obligation es-
sential, then to be more than a mere "paperwork duty," it must be re-
sponsible for defining the appropriate standard of care. 4
84. It should be noted that this argument gains significant strength given the extensive re-
quirements imposed on health care providers by PSDA.
85. Strachan, 538 A.2d 346.
86. Id. at 349.
87. Id. at 348. The plaintiffs initially filed suit against the hospital, the hospital administra-
tor, the physicians involved, and the Delaware Valley Transplant Program, but the case was dis-
missed voluntarily against all but the hospital and administrator. Id.
88. Id. at 348-49.
89. Id. at 349.
90. Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 300, 507 A.2d 718, 719
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
91. Strachan, 538 A.2d at 349.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The court explained its position:
The imposition of a paperwork duty does little to advance either the mission of health-care
providers or the needs of society. If "procedures" are to be viewed as more than mere
"paperwork" and considered indispensable in this area-in the nature of a standard that gov-
erns the medical community-then those procedures should be designed and imposed by
those most directly involved, the physicians and hospitals themselves. That is the business of




Thus, given the delicate nature of such matters, the Strachan court
found that the establishment of an absolute duty in this area would
impose too much of a burden on the medical community. For a stan-
dard to have any real significance, it must be more than a declaration
by the court. It must encompass the views of the health care commu-
nity as a whole.
3. General Duty to Act Reasonably
Although the Strachan court chose not to define an absolute duty
to establish procedures for the termination of life support, it did find
liability under another duty of care: to act reasonably in respecting the
family's legitimate request to relinquish their son's body.95 The absence
of procedures to disconnect a patient from life support systems was but
one factor considered by the court in determining whether the hospital
satisfied its duty of reasonableness owed to the Strachans9 8
Given the foreseeability of a patient's wish to be disconnected from
life support, if a hospital insists on consent forms or procedures for tak-
ing a body off of life support, then the hospital has a duty either to
have the forms or procedures in place, or to make some sort of arrange-
ment immediately upon the family's request.17 By refusing to impose an
absolute duty to have procedures in place, the Strachan court acknowl-
edged the difficulty inherent in right to die cases. Yet, by recognizing a
general duty to act reasonably, the court struck an appropriate balance
between the needs of the medical community and the wishes of the pa-
tient and his family. If a hospital will not disconnect life support with-
out such procedures, given the foreseeability of a living will or right to
die incident, having procedures in place is both necessary and
reasonable.
4. Breach of Contract
If an individual, or more likely her family, feels that life support
was continued 'inappropriately by a health care provider, the family
might make a conscious decision to withhold payment for services,
breaching their contract with that health care provider. Under these
circumstances, wrongful maintenance of life support would not com-
prise an action, but a defense to a breach of contract suit. In Grace
Plaza, the health care facility filed a breach of contract action to re-
cover fees for care rendered to the defendant's wife before a court order
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 349-50.
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was obtained allowing termination of nutrition and hydration. 8 The
court reasoned that because New York does not accept any form of sur-
rogate decisionmaking, Grace Plaza did not act wrongfully in maintain-
ing life support until the court declared that the patient's desire was
not to be maintained by artificial means. 9 Because Grace Plaza com-
mitted no legal wrong by continuing medical treatment until it obtained
judicial approval, the court held that the facility was entitled to pay-
ment of medical fees.100
Under a different set of facts, improper maintenance of medical
treatment clearly would constitute a defense to a breach of contract for
medical services suit. As a practical matter, where to place the burden
of the cost of uncertainty about the patient's desire in such case is
problematic. If the burden is placed upon the health care provider,
cases will proceed to court only if there is a serious question about the
sufficiency of the evidence.' 0' By contrast, if the burden is placed on the
family, plaintiffs will be able to bring fewer cases because of the emo-
tional and financial costs.
10 2
5. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
Given that the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right
to die, 03 a patient or her family could bring a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983
action for violation of this constitutional right. Recovery under such a
theory has two requirements. First, the plaintiff must establish that the
physician or hospital is a state actor. In Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation
98. Grace Plaza, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
99. Id. at 856-57. The court explained New York law:
New York at present expressly rejects any form of surrogate decision making in "right to die"
cases because such an approach would be "inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to
the notion that no person or court should substitute its judgment as to what would be an
acceptable quality of life for another."
Id. at 857 (citations omitted). The court also clarified its previous order granting Mrs. Elbaum the
right to be taken off of life support. "What we obviously did not hold... is that the plaintiff acted
wrongfully in keeping Mrs. Elbaum alive until the actual nature of her desires had in fact been
proved." Id. at 856 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 860. The dissent in Grace Plaza characterized the facts differently and gave pa-
tient autonomy more weight. "Grace Plaza is on record as having discounted utterly the patient's
wishes to die naturally, proclaiming itself to be the transcendent arbiter of the patient's artificial
life support." Id. at 860-61 (quoting Judge Rosenblatt). According to the dissent, the court's hold-
ing "allows a nursing home to profit financially, while ignoring a patient's wishes, as it imposes its
own ethical standards upon her." Id. at 861. The gist of the dissent's reasoning is that in maintain-
ing medical treatment, Grace Plaza was not acting out of a fear of liability because the patient's
wishes were not clearly established; rather, it was imposing its own ethical beliefs on the patient.
Id. at 861-64.
101. Gasner, 11 S.L.U. Pub. L. Rev. at 513 (cited in note 64).
102. Id. at 514 (notes omitted).
103. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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Hospital,0 " the plaintiff unsuccessfully brought a Section 1983 action
for failure to cease medical treatment and deprivation of his privacy
rights.105 His estate's action failed because of its inability to establish
that the hospital and physician were state actors.106
Even if the plaintiff successfully establishes state action, she must
overcome another difficult obstacle. To recover, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant state actor intended to violate her constitutional
rights.107 In Bartling, the plaintiffs could not recover for deprivation of
constitutional rights because the court concluded that the defendant
did not act with conscious disregard for Mr. Bartling's rights. 0 8 The
requirements of proving state action and intent stand as serious hin-
drances to recovery under Section 1983.
A successful Section 1983 action does bring with it, however, the
possibility of recovery of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Section
1988(b). °9 In Gray v. Romeo,°10 the plaintiff previously had recovered
damages under a Section 1983 action for the defendant's refusal to
withdraw a feeding tube.1 In this action, the plaintiff recovered just
over $38,000 in attorney's fees accrued during her previous action." 2
Such a recovery provides the plaintiff with additional incentive to re-
cover for a constitutional rights violation.
B. State Living Will and Natural Death Legislation
In response to the growing recognition of patients' rights, many
states have enacted "natural death" or "living will" legislation enabling
patients to dictate for themselves the withdrawal of medical assistance
upon diagnosis of a terminal condition."3 In general, two principal
types of statutes exist: durable power of attorney for health care stat-
104. 676 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
105. Id. at 1530.
106. Id. at 1535. "In the case at bar, plaintiff has failed to show specific conduct of the
defendants that can be considered state action causally connected to plaintiff's injury." Id. at 1536
(emphasis added).
107. Gasner, 11 S.L.U. Pub. L. Rev. at 507-08 (cited in note 64).
108. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
109. This section provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of Sections
1981, 1981A, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681
et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's
fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. 1991).
110. 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1989).
111. Id. at 326.
112. Id. at 328.
113. Jeffery J. Delaney, Note, Specific Intent, Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: A
Nationwide Analysis of an Individual's Right to Die, 11 Pace L. Rev. 565, 630 (1991).
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utes and living will or natural death acts.114 Durable power of attorney
for health care statutes allow an individual to designate surrogate deci-
sionmakers for medical treatment in the event that the individual be-
comes incapacitated.115 Living will acts allow individuals to specify
what type of medical care they want to receive should they become
incompetent." 6
The requirements of living will and natural death statutes vary
from state to state, but distilling a few general requirements is possible.
Usually, the actual document must be witnessed by two competent
adults who are not related to the declarant by blood or marriage.1 17 The
statutory forms also allow individuals to specify what their medical con-
dition must be before the living will takes effect.11 8 The declarant also
may specify which forms of treatment she wishes to receive, such as
whether a feeding tube is to be allowed.1 9
More importantly, in the area of physician and medical liability,
these statutes generally serve to insulate those health care providers
who help effectuate the living will from both civil and criminal liabil-
ity.'20 For example, a statute may exempt from liability any health fa-
cility, physician, or health care provider acting under direction of a
physician if the requirements of the statute are met.' Many statutes
also impose the additional requirement that all health care providers
who participate in fulfilling the living will must act in accordance with
reasonable medical standards to avoid liability or a citation for unpro-
fessional conduct. 22 This additional requirement is common in many
living will statutes, and courts might view it as an extension of the phy-
sician's or health care provider's general duty of care.
Although virtually all of these statutes contemplate liability that
might arise from compliance with the provisions of a living will, liability
for failure to comply with the patient's wishes receives varying treat-
114. Id.
115. Id. (citations omitted).
116. Id. at 630-31 (citations omitted). This Note primarily considers living will and natural
death statutes.
117. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-3 (Michie Supp. 1992), Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-
11-11 (Burns 1990), Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-104 (Supp. 1992), and W. Va. Code § 16-30-3 (Supp.
1992).
118. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-3(b) (Michie Supp. 1992) (allowing the declar-
ant to specify if she wants the will to take effect upon any of the following: "a terminal condition,
... a coma with no reasonable expectation of regaining consciousness, or... a persistent vegetative
state with no reasonable expectation of regaining significant cognitive function").
119. See, for example, id.; Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-12 (Burns 1990); and Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 32-11-105 (Supp. 1992).
120. See, for example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-110 (Supp. 1992).
121. Id. § 32-11-110(h).
122. Id. § 32-11-110(i).
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ment.1 23 Transfer provisions are the primary means by which state stat-
utes address conflicts between patient and physician autonomy. In
essence, these statutes provide that an attending physician who does
not wish to participate either in the withdrawal or withholding of medi-
cal care either can or must take steps to transfer the patient to another
qualified physician.
12 4
State statutes employ four general types of transfer provisions. The
most prevalent version imposes a duty on the physician to transfer the
patient. An attending physician may discharge this duty by making ei-
ther a successful transfer or a reasonable, good faith effort to trans-
fer.12 5 The slightly different Alabama version of this provision creates
no duty but simply permits transfer to another physician.1 26 The third
variation of the transfer provision imposes no duty on the physician to
transfer; instead, these statutes place the burden on the patient, the
surrogate decisionmaker, or the family to arrange for transfer. 12 7
Finally, Minnesota employs a unique version of the transfer provi-
sion. If the physician or other health care provider notifies a competent
patient of her unwillingness to comply with the patient's wishes, that
provider has no duty to transfer. 2 8 If the physician fails to notify the
patient before the patient becomes incompetent, the statute places a
123. See, for example, D.C. Code § 6-2427 (1981) (stating that failure to transfer the patient
or comply with a living will constitutes unprofessional conduct); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-8(b)
(Michie Supp. 1992) (granting no civil liability for good faith refusal to comply with a living will,
but the physician must either transfer the patient or allow the family to obtain a new physician);
Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-14(e) (Burns 1990) (stating that failure to transfer the patient or comply
with a living will results in disciplinary sanctions); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-5(B) (Michie 1978)
(giving a physician immunity from civil and criminal liability if she takes appropriate steps to
transfer the patient); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1992) (stating that failure to comply
with a living will or transfer the patient may result in civil liability and professional disciplinary
action, including revocation or suspension of license); and W. Va. Code § 16-30-7(b) (Supp. 1992)
(requiring a physician to make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient).
124. See, for example, D.C. Code § 6-2427(b) (1981); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-8(b) (Michie
Supp. 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 16-8-11-14(e) (Burns 1990); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-7-5(B) (Michie
1978); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1992); and W. Va. Code § 16-30-7(b). Compare
Bartling, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (discussing a hospital's unsuccessful attempts to transfer a patient
to another hospital). See notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
Some states include similar provisions for a physician who does not wish to follow the direc-
tives of a surrogate appointed by a durable power of attorney for health care statute. See, for
example, Ga. Code Ann. § 31-36-7(2) (Michie 1991).
125. See, for example, Ga. Code Ann. § 31-32-8(b) (Michie Supp. 1992); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 26.2h-62 (West Supp. 1992); S.D. Cod. Laws § 34-12D-11 (Supp. 1992); and Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1992).
126. Ala. Code § 22-8A-8(a) (1990).
127. See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110.5, § 703(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) and Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat.
§ 311.634 (Supp. 1992).
128. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145B.06(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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duty on the physician to transfer.12 Several states, however, have no
transfer provisions in their natural death statutes.130
Some living will statutes also mandate specified penalties for fail-
ure to transfer. Of the states that do specify penalties, the vast majority
hold a physician guilty of unprofessional conduct for a willful failure to
transfer.' 31 A number of states provide that willful failure to transfer by
an attending physician or other health care provider constitutes a crim-
inal misdemeanor. 1 2 Alaska takes a unique approach in penalizing a
failure to effect a transfer by providing that the exclusive penalty shall
be a maximum fine of one thousand dollars plus the actual costs ac-
crued by the patient because of noncompliance."3 "
Clearly, the state statutes differ in approach and comprehensive-
ness, but the more recent statutes generally contemplate the problems
and conflicts arising from advance directives more completely. PSDA
should have an enormous effect on the way legislatures treat these is-
sues in the future. State natural death legislation enacted after PSDA
reflects these changes. For example, New Jersey's Advance Directives
for Health Care Statute,3 3 enacted in the beginning of 1992, is very
comprehensive and incorporates much of PSDA.
IV. PRESERVING AUTONOMY AND PREVENTING THE CONFLICT
No simple panacea can cure the inherent conflicts between patient
and physician autonomy. Both parties have interests supported by im-
mense conviction and emotion. With such strong interests at stake, any
possible solution will be imperfect at best. Although this realization is
indeed unattractive and hard to swallow, the medical and legal commu-
nities can take steps to minimize conflicts in order to protect each
party's autonomy as much as possible. This Part suggests several steps
that can improve the present situation. The first two suggestions are
precautionary in nature and seek to prevent any conflict or improper
maintenance of care from the outset. The final two remedies contem-
plate situations in which some course of treatment has led to a conflict.
129. Id. at § 145B.06(b).
130. See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19a-570 et seq. (West Supp. 1992); 16 Del.
Code Ann. § 2501 et seq. (1983); and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-320 et seq. (1990).
131. See, for example, Cal. Health and Safety Code § 7191 (West Supp. 1992); S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-77-100 (Law Co-op Supp. 1991); and Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-1112 (Supp. 1992).
132. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 20-17-209 (1992); 18-A Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 5-708
(Supp. 1991); and Mont. Code'Ann. § 50-9-206 (1991). Many of these states also classify willful
failure to record a terminal condition as a crime. See id.
133. Alaska Stat. § 18.12.070(a) (1991).
134. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:2H-53 et seq. (West Supp. 1992).
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A. Market Participant Requirements
One potential solution simply consists of advising individuals to
take an active role in choosing a physician and health care facilities.
Patients would select health care providers based upon their stance on
right to die issues. Thus, selection of health care providers would re-
semble the selection of any other commodity in the marketplace.
3 5
Those individuals who value individual autonomy could choose physi-
cians or other providers who share their views. Those persons either
with no strong view or who are ethically opposed to the withdrawal or
withholding of life support similarly could elect to use like-minded
physicians.
This idea works well in an ideal world, but in reality, several fac-
tors prevent its widespread use. First, such a scenario assumes that the
patient or consumer has perfect knowledge. A patient with means may
be able to determine her physician's ethical stance, but the everyday
person generally will not have access or foresight to inquire about such
information. Kentucky's Living Will Act'1 6 takes a novel approach that
may help to remedy this concern. This statute provides that no physi-
cian, nurse, or health care employee will be held liable for failure to
comply with an advance directive if that objection is stated in writing
to the hospital or health care facility and if the individual follows the
other provisions of the statute pertaining to patient notification and
transfer.1 7 This novel solution could provide both the hospital and pa-
tient with information about which health care providers are best
suited to care for like-minded patients.
The second concern is that the physician, hospital, or clinic used by
an individual may represent the only choice available. Financial consid-
erations limit many patients' choices of health care providers. Geo-
graphic location, such as a rural area, also may limit the choice to none
at all. A national health care system currently under consideration also
could limit patient choices. Finally, emergency situations often prevent
selection of a health care facility or physician. In fact, these situations
may account for conflicts encountered most often in this area.
B. Drafting Advance Directives
The second protective step is to draft a more comprehensive and
detailed living will that reduces uncertainty about action in a given sit-
uation. This suggestion stems from the premise that individuals do not
135. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market Oppor-
tunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 143 (1986).




contemplate fully the entire range of situations in which they want
their advance directives followed. A general directive may not answer
all of a physician's questions about what to do under a given set of
circumstances. The potentially reversible situation encountered by a
physician exemplifies this concern. The easiest way to minimize this
problem is to improve the methods used to draft advance directives.
This solution does have limitations because no document can con-
template all possible situations and a too detailed and lengthy docu-
ment might become cumbersome. A well-developed instrument is,
however, clearly within reason. Drafting should involve consultation
with a physician in order to satisfy a dual purpose. The physician may
provide insight into possible trouble areas in which an instrument could
provide direction. At the same time, this consultation serves to inform
the individual of possible life threatening situations so she can decide
what course of action should be followed under a given set of circum-
stances. Because this type of forethought may force the individual to
contemplate difficult decisions and situations, the presence of the fam-
fly physician may help alleviate the discomfort and provide valuable
advice.
C. Actions Under PSDA
Although the above two suggestions are preventive in nature, the
next two consider how to address problems after a conflict has arisen.
First, with the advent of PSDA, it has become necessary to reconsider
what sort of common-law actions should be allowed. In Strachan, the
court refused to find an absolute duty for providers to have procedures
in place for the removal of life support systems. 138 With PSDA now in
place, a strong argument exists that this duty should bind all hospitals.
As evidenced by the number of living will statutes that have been en-
acted, the states clearly see that self-determination of patients is a right
to be given substantial protection. Furthermore, PSDA requires hospi-
tals to be aware of these state requirements and to inform the patient
and hospital staff of them. Instances of individuals wishing to exercise
the right to terminate life support are no longer rare. Thus, hospitals
should anticipate this trend and have procedures in place for the re-
moval of life support. Although an absolute duty to establish proce-
dures might have seemed overreaching and burdensome at one time, it
now appears appropriate.
An individual also might argue convincingly that a breach of the
duties established in PSDA itself gives rise to an action in negligence.
The statute arguably creates several duties that could support tort ac-
138. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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tions. A viable cause of action might arise when a hospital fails to in-
form the patient of her rights under state law or fails to inform the
patient of its policies with regard to the 'withdrawal of life support. This
duty places a large burden on the hospital to educate its patients and is
problematic in emergency cases, but certainly protects patient auton-
omy. Furthermore, because PSDA directs the hospital to respect the
patient's rights as established by statute or common law, failure to re-
spect those rights could constitute a breach of duty.
D. Clearly Defined Transfer Provisions
The final suggestion contemplates the situation in which interests
of the patient and physician collide and create a stalemate. As dis-
cussed earlier, an individual may take steps to reduce the risk of con-
flicts when medical treatment has been anticipated, but emergencies
and other situations remain problematic. In their proper role, the trans-
fer provisions in state natural death statutes seek to protect both pa-
tient and physician autonomy. A transfer ensures compliance with the
individual's wishes while preserving the physician's or hospital's choice
not to participate in an activity that might be viewed as inappropriate
or unethical.
Upon reflection, transfer provisions are the only method of achiev-
ing this end, but at best they are only an imperfect solution. Even with
a provision in place, a transfer does not remedy all possible problems.
At least three scenarios exist in which a transfer provision would not
resolve a possible conflict in autonomy. First, no other physician or hos-
pital may accept a patient who wishes to be disconnected from life sup-
port. Even assuming that another health care provider has no problem
with assisting a patient in a natural death, a difference exists between
facing the problem with an existing patient and accepting a patient
with the express intent of withdrawing life support. Although a physi-
cian may agree to respect a patient's wishes when a right to die situa-
tion arises unexpectedly, accepting a patient only to aid in her death
seems a quantitatively different situation. Many health care providers
may not wish to act in such a purposeful situation.
Hospitals and physicians in rural and remote areas present addi-
tional problems for transfer provisions. In many areas, the doctor or
health care facility may be the only option; no other convenient or rea-
sonable provider may exist. Finally, in a rural area or not, a time lag
certainly will exist between when the patient wants her directive carried
out and the directive's actual effectuation in the event of a transfer.
These problems are inherent in any type of system that seeks to
balance the competing autonomy interests of patients and health care
providers. Giving meaning to the term "transfer," however, might
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lessen the possibility for infringement on both parties' autonomy when
such a conflict exists. Most states only recently have enacted natural
death statutes. Given that the statutes and the dilemma involving
transfers in such situations are new, both the patient and physician
may be unaware of their rights and duties arising from these provisions.
By defining how far the duty to transfer extends, all parties may take
steps to preserve their autonomy.
When Congress enacted the Anti-Dumping Act " 9 under COBRA in
order to curb incidents of patient dumping, it specifically defined trans-
fer in the context of the Act.140 Although the definition of transfer
under the Anti-Dumping Act has little relevance to a natural death
statute, a detailed definition particularly suited to natural death acts
would provide a way to lessen the uncertainty surrounding transfers. At
present, the physician has no idea exactly what steps she must take to
comply with the meaning of the natural death statute. Although the
desired definition of transfer might vary under differing circumstances,
both physician and patient would benefit from a well-defined rule.
Ideally, the statute should place the burden of transfer on the phy-
sician or hospital, because they have the best access to information
about options and alternatives. Indeed, most states follow this course.
14
1
The definition of transfer also should give the provider an idea of how
much effort should be expended in finding a replacement. Most statutes
allow for a reasonable, good faith effort. Given the sensitivity of the
issue, this duty should be recast as exploring every reasonable option
within the community. If the individual inhabits a remotely populated
area, the physician seeking the transfer should consider other major
care providers in the state.
Finally, the definition of transfer should take account of possible
delay in effectuating the transfer. Tennessee's statute makes an appro-
priate statement disclaiming liability for the transferring provider until
the transfer is completed." 2 A provider should not be held liable for the
maintenance of life support while seeking to find a suitable alternative.
Although this immunity impinges on the patient's autonomy, it pre-
serves that of the health care provider and reflects a reasonable com-
promise between the two positions. Even with this clarification of the
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. 1992).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4) defines transfer:
The term "transfer" means the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside a
hospital's facilities at the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or associated,
directly or indirectly, with) the hospital, but does not include such a movement of an individ-
ual who (A) has been declared dead, or (B) leaves the facility without the permission of any
such person.
141. See notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
142. Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-11-108(a) (Supp. 1992).
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term transfer under a natural death statute, patients and physicians in-
variably will confront situations in which a transfer cannot be made
easily or at all. In such a situation, the imperfections of the transfer
provision provide little relief, but hopefully reasonable parties can find
some solution.
V. CONCLUSION
With our society facing an increased number of senior citizens re-
quiring medical care and a health care system that seems to be increas-
ing in cost to the consumer, more individuals will face difficult decisions
about whether to maintain or withdraw life support systems in situa-
tions when a terminal condition has been diagnosed. A more liberal out-
look on an individual choosing to die naturally has emerged in recent
years as evidenced by the increased number of living will and natural
death statutes. The removal of much of the stigma surrounding the
right to die brings with it the opinion that, in some cases, the termina-
tion of life support is the most humane choice for both the patient and
the family.
To ensure that these choices are respected, the medical and legal
communities need to find an approach that will safeguard the auton-
omy of both the individual patient and the health care provider. Be-
cause physicians and patients most frequently will face the possibility
of a transfer when there are conflicts between the parties' autonomy,
legislatures should draft transfer provisions that clearly define the
rights and obligations of both parties. With such direction, fewer in-
stances that threaten the patient's and the physician's autonomy will
arise.
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